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Abst ract - - In  this paper, we propose a dynamic cryptographic key assignment scheme based on 
Newton's interpolation method and a predefined one way function. All users are classified into 
disjoint sets of security classes that employ the relation of partial ordering, that is, a security class at 
higher level can derive from his own cryptographic key the keys of the other  security class below him. 
Compared with the existing assignment schemes, our scheme always produces economic ryptographic 
keys, which are smaller than the keys generated by the previous work in a tree structure. Furthermore, 
whenever a new security class is inserted into the user hierarchy system, the corresponding keys can 
be determined without changing any existing keys. Therefore, our scheme is suitable for practical 
implementation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Information security is a very important opic in the computer communication system. Up to 
the present, the popularity of computer networks and fast progress of computer technologies 
on a multi-user system make sharing of expensive resources a reality. However, sharing may 
cause some undesired phenomena such as unauthorized accesses and inconsistent status of shared 
resources. Therefore, an important issue in a multi-user computer environment is the question 
of how to control the access to computers. Besides, how to identify whether a user has enough 
privileges to retrieve the messages and/or change the access rights of the other users is another 
important issue. To date, many papers [1-14] have addressed this problem. In this paper, we 
study this problem on a computer communication system organized in a tree structure. In order 
to broadcast information within a tree structured system, we need to have a method to ensure 
the security of the system. A method based on cryptography was proposed in [1] for controlling 
access to information among a group of users in a hierarchy. This method employs the relation of 
partial ordering, that is, a user at higher level can derive from his own cryptographic key the keys 
of the other users below him in the hierarchy organization, and then retrieve messages destined 
to the users at lower levels. In addition, this method has another important property of being 
able to provide security against two or more users at lower level of the system collaborating to 
derive a higher leveled key to which they are not entitled. 
When the number of users becomes larger, the key generation algorithm in [1] becomes in- 
efficient and infeasible. Therefore, an improved method was proposed in [12] for reducing the 
key values by using a canonical assignment method. Recently, Harn et ai. [8] presented another 
improved method. Instead of using the top-down key assignment approach as in [1,12], their 
scheme adopted a bottom-up approach. 
Tree structure is a special case of the hierarchy structure, yet it is very popular in our daily 
life. For example, the personnel organization of a company or an army, the pedigree chart and 
the lineal chart [15] are typical tree structures. In this paper, we propose an efficient dynamic 
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cryptographic key assignment scheme in a tree structure for access control. The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related research. Our efficient dynamic 
cryptographic key assignment scheme for assigning cryptographic keys in a tree structure is 
described in Section 3. The correctness ofour security enforcing scheme is established inSection 4. 
Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 5. 
2 .  RELATED RESEARCH 
A method for assigning cryptographic keys for access control in a hierarchy was first proposed 
in [1]. It assumes that all users in a computer communication system are distributed into m 
disjoint classes Ci, i • S, where S -- {1,2,... ,m}, and these classes receive messages from an 
authority Co. The set of classes is partially ordered by the partial ordering relation "<". If 
there exists a relation between Ci and Cj, i.e., Ci < Cj, it means that users in Cj can retrieve 
information destined for users in Ci, while the opposite is not allowed. Besides, every class Ci, 
i • S, must satisfy the relation Ci < Co, since no user in the system is allowed to retrieve 
messages of Co. 
First, the authority Co generates a set of keys Ki's, and secretly sends each Ki to the class Ci, 
i = 1, 2, . . . ,  m. In [1], the keys Ki can be generated as follows. A public integer ti is assigned 
to each class Ci with the condition 
Ci <_ Cj if and only if tj [ti.* (2.1) 
In addition, the authority C0 chooses a random secret key K0 and a secret pair (p, q) of large 
prime numbers, and makes M = p • q public. Then Ki = K~ ~ (mod M) is sent to Ci. By 
condition (2.1), ti/tj  is an integer if Cj >_ Ci. Thus, Cj can compute Ki by the following 
deduction 
K, = K~' = (KtoJ) t'pj = K~ 'l'i (mod M). 
However, if Cj ~ C~, then ti/tj is not an integer. Thus, Cj does not have the ability to retrieve 
the information destined to users in Ci in case the information isencrypted by Ki. Unfortunately, 
there exists a very serious problem: two or more users of the system can collaborate to derive a key 
to which they are not entitled. In order to avoid this drawback, anew scheme was proposed in [1]. 
This new scheme demands that each ti, 1 < i < m, should be computed from t/ = 1-Ivj~gc~ PJ, 
where Pj, j • S, is a distinct prime assigned to Cj. These t~'s can ensure that condition (2.1) is 
not violated. Moreover, collaborative attacks are not possible. 
Furthermore, a canonical assignment method [12] was proposed to reduce the value of ti. In 
this algorithm, the hierarchy structure is first decomposed into a set of disjoint chains. Each 
chain is a tOtally ordered subset and is assigned a distinct prime. For node i, they define the rule 
ni = pe., where ei denotes the depth of the node from the top of the chain whose associated 
prime is P. After all ni's are assigned, ti's are computed from the formula ti - lcmvjl~c~n j. 
Recently, Harn et al. [8] presented another improved method. Instead of using the top-down 
key assignment approach as in [1,12], their scheme adopts a bottom-up approach. It first assigns 
each security class Ci a distinct prime Pi, and makes these primes public. Then it calculates 
the multiplication inverse di for each class C/. It means that di = p~-I mod ¢(M), where 
~(M) denotes the Euler's number of M. This new scheme demands that each tj, 1 < j < m, 
should be computed from tj = l-I Pi, for all i such that Ci is the successor of Cj. Then Kj = 
KorId, rood ¢(M)(mo d M) is sent to Cj. Once the secret keys and the corresponding public keys 
are generated, Cj can compute Ki by the following deduction 
Ki = Kj j/t' mod M. 
The common drawback of the previous work is the size of storage for storing public keys 
grows dramatically. In the following section, we present a dynamic ryptographic key assignment 
scheme based on Newton's interpolation method and a predefined one way function. Comparing 
with the existing assignment schemes, our scheme always produces economic ryptographic keys, 
which are smaller than the keys generated by the previous work in a tree structure. 
*tjlti means ti is divisible by tj .  
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Since our proposed scheme is based on a predefined one way function and Newton's inter- 
polation polynomials (NIP for short) [16-18] in this section, we first introduce their ideas and 
methods. Intuitively, a one way function is a function that is easy to apply but hard to reverse. 
Formally, if a function F : A -~ B is a one way function, it is a one-to-one function and implies 
that 
(1) for every x in A, F(x) can be computed easily, and 
(2) for every y = F(x) in B, it is infeasible to compute z. 
On the other hand, suppose there exist n + 1 points denoted as (xl,yi),  0 < i < n. Then the 
NIP with degree n passing through these n + 1 points can be derived as 
NP(x) = • 
j---O "-- 
(3.1) 
Each coefficient f [z0,xx, . . . ,z j ]  in equation (3.1) can be computed by the divided differences 
[16,17]. Without loss of generality, let each coefficient be represented in some residue class of 
prime P and P > yl, 0 < i < n. Then a NIP can be expressed as equation (3.2), 
NP(~e) = (c~n(z - Xn-1)(x - x , -2 ) . . .  (x - z0) +""  + c~2(z - zx)(x - z0) + oq(z - x0) 
+ c~0) rood P. (3.2) 
In equation (3.2), let NP(z i )  = Yi rood P, 1 < i < n, and all c~i's are constant coefficients. 
In our scheme, let P be a large prime number and F be a predefined one way function. Besides, 
both P and F are public. Furthermore, let Cil, Ci2,..., Ci~ be the immediate successors of Ci 
with the public key pairs (t lq, t2q), (t l i2,t2i2), . . . ,  (tli~,t2i~), respectively. In the following, an 
efficient algorithm for assigning the secret key and the corresponding public key pairs for each 
security class is presented. Our algorithm essentially consists of two phases. 
(1) In the first phase, we assign public key pair (tll,t2i) for each security class Ci, starting 
from the root and going down to leaves. 
(2) In the second phase, we generate secret key K~ for each security class Ci, starting from 
the root and going down to leaves. 
The first phase of our algorithm assigns each security class Ci of the tree T a key pair (tl~,t2i), 
which is equal to the pair (c~i, zi) in NIP. After all (t l l , t2i) 's are assigned, all Ki's are computed 
in phase 2. 
ALGORITHM ASSIGNMENT 
INPUT: A tree T. 
OUTPUT: A set of (tli, t2i)'s and Ki's being assigned to the nodes of T, respectively. 
Phase 1: Assign public key pair (tli, t2i) for each node Ci, starting from the root and going down 
to leaves. 
STEP 1.1: Assign distinct key pairs (t l l ,t2i) 's for all the non-root nodes Ci's, 1 < i < n. 
Phase 2: Generate a secret key Ki for each node Ci, starting from the root and going down to 
leaves. 
STEP 2.1: For root node Co, do 
(2.1.1) randomly select an integer K0 among 1 and P -  1. 
(2.1.2) let C1, C2,. . . ,  Ck be immediate successors of Co, then generate a NIP of degree k 
over the Galois field GF(P) ,  denoted as NP(x)  = (ak(z - Z~-l)(X - zk-2). . .  
(X-  X0)+''"  "~ a l (X -  X0)+ a0) mod P, where (ao,zo) = (0, Ko), and (ai,zi) = 
(tli,t2i), 1 < i < k. 
(2.1.3) compute the secret key Ki of Ci as Ki = F(NP( t2 i ) )  mod P, 1 < i < k. 
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STEP 2.2: For each non-root and non-leaf node (7/, do 
(2.2.1) let Cil, Ci2,. . . ,  Cik be immediate successors ofCi, then generate a NIP of degree k
over the Galois field GF(P), denoted as NP(x) = (ak(z - Zk_l)(Z - zk-2). . .  
(X -  X0) .~t . . . .  + O~1( x __ X0 ) + O~0) mod P,  where (a0 ,z0)  = (o, gl), and (aj ,z j )  = 
(tlb,t2ij), 1 < j <_ k. 
(2.2.2) compute the secret key Kij of Cij as Kij = F(NP(t2ij)) mod P, 1 < j < k. 
The following example illustrates how Ki's are assigned by the algorithm proposed above. 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the tree structure as depicted in Figure 1. Without loss of generality, 
let the prime number P = 13 and the pseudo one way function F(x) = z 2 + 1 (mod P). By 
employing the algorithm Assignment, C0 can assign public key pairs (tli,t2i) and generate Ki 
for each security class, 0 < i < 7, as shown in Table 1. 
C o 
Figure 1. The tree structure. 
Table I. The public key pairs and secret keys in Figure I. 
Co 
C1 
C4 
CZ 
Public key pair Secret key 
( t l i , t2 i )  = (a i ,x i )  K i  = F (NP( t21) )  
- -  1 
(x,3) 5 
(2,4) 4 
(1,6) 2 
(2,s) s 
(1 ,s) 2 
(2,6) 11 
(3,8) I0 
Note that the security class Ci can compute the keys of the security classes below him, which 
is not an immediate successor, by repeatedly employing algorithm Derivation below. 
ALGORITHM DERIVATION 
INPUT: Secret key Ki. 
OUTPUT:  Secret key Kij. 
STEP 1: Using Newton's interpolation method, reconstruct interpolating polynomial NP(z) = 
(~k(x--~_,)(z--xk_2).. .  (z--x0)+...-hal (z--x0)q-a0) mod P, where (so, z0) - (0, g,), 
and (aj,xj) = (tlij,t21~), 1 < j < k. 
STEP 2: Compute the secret key Ki, as Ki i = F(NP(t2ij)) rood P, where t2ij is the public key 
of Cij. 
Now, a new node is inserted to the tree structure, say Cs. Figure 2 shows this condition. 
C o 
Figure 2. The new node Us is inserted into the system. 
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In our scheme, whenever a new node is inserted into the user hierarchy system, the correspond- 
ing secret key will be determined immediately without changing any previously defined secret 
keys and public key pairs. That  is, by employing the algorithm Assignment, a new public key 
pair ( t ls , t2s)  = (4, 7) is given and a secret key Ks is computed as 
NP(z )  = 4(x -S ) (x -6 ) (x -5 ) (z -4 )+3(x -6) (x -5 ) (x -4 )+2(x -5) (z -4 )T  l (x -4 )+O)  mod 13. 
Thus, NP(7)  - ( -24  + 18 + 12 + 3) mod 13 = 9 and Ke = F (NP(7) )  "- (92 + 1) mod 13 = 4. 
4. THE SECURITY  AND COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY  
In our scheme, each security class Ci can derive the secret keys of his immediate successors 
by using NIP and the predefined one way function F. However, it is impossible to reconstruct 
NIP by only knowing the public key pairs of Ci's immediate successors, because all the public 
key pairs of Ci's immediate successors can only construct an NIP',  which has one less degree 
than that of the original NIP. Therefore, our scheme can provide security against two or more 
users at lower level of the system collaborating to derive a higher leveled key to which they are 
not entitled. In addition, each immediate successor Ci~ of Ci cannot reveal the root of NIP 
by using his secret key Kij, because the secret key is computed from the predefined one way 
function F. Hence, a user at lower level cannot derive from his own cryptographic key the keys 
of the other users above him in a tree structure. Hence, the correctness of our security enforcing 
scheme is established. Furthermore, it is easily seen that the computational complexity of our 
scheme heavily relies on the construction of NIP. However, Knuth [18] has proposed an efficient 
0(k log s k) time algorithm for NIP, where k is the number of immediate successors of the current 
security class. Therefore, our scheme only needs O(n log s n) time for practical implementation. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have proposed a dynamic scheme to assign cryptographic keys in a tree 
structure for access control. It is ensured to prevent the cooperative attacks and effectively 
reduce the values of ti's. Besides, no modification of the secret keys and public key pairs is 
needed when a new security class is inserted into the system or an old security class is deleted 
from the system, while almost all past access control schemes need. Hence, this scheme is feasible 
for assigning cryptographic keys in a tree structure. 
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